Friday, July 16, 2004
Investigating the Walk and Run AccidentBonds got a hit without scoring yesterday, bringing his Runs to Hits numbers to 71 and 70.
I confess to having been as fascinated as David about Bonds' bizarre walk totals, OBP, and OPS this year, and equally amazed at how widely OPS is now bandied about the mainstream media, and how misunderstood it is as a short-hand.
Some sources have calculated an OBP point is anywhere from 1.5 to 3 times as valuable as a SLG percentage point. In Moneyball, Paul DePodesta indicates to the author a belief through analysis that it's closer to 3 or more, which is why the Oakland A's draft on OBP, not on OPS. Barry's OBP this year is reaching truly stratospheric proportions, over .600, and his slugging percentage, while impressive, is completely in line with his last half dozen years. Slugging percentage, of course, is a big lie compared to OBP for one simple reason: the theoretical maximum of OBP is 1.000, while the theoretical maximum of SLG is 4.000. A triple isn't worth exactly three times a single, a homer isn't worth exactly twice a double, yet that's what slugging percentage tells you.
What I suspect the managers who are walking Barry so much are engaged in is a groupthink that barely understands SLG and OPS and does so in the context of a bunch of old managerial saws about not letting the best guy beat you. They pitch around him so as to avoid giving him the opportunity to slug them in. But Barry's slugging percentage hasn't gotten any better.
I did a little exercise today which I admit is flawed both statistically and sabrmetrically, but which I think illustrates two points. One is, Barry is not having an exceptional season despite what the OPS indicates. The second is how utterly pointless the intentional walk is to him in the aggregate, and the walk in general. Barry can be gotten out, when pitched to, at the same rate he could be gotten out for a decade.
I have two very crude measures which sort of ape the inaccuracies of OPS but which are suggestive. I looked at Barry's total trips to any single base, excluding error and HBP, not bothering to control for at-bats, etc. (which is what percentages do). In other words, we just add his walks to his total bases. We're measuring the number of times Barry traveled 90 feet.
For a brief period, there was the concept of "Run Production", which was Runs plus RBI. Both stats are heavily line-up dependent, of course, RBI far more than Runs (especially since you can collect more than one RBI per plate appearance). Adding them together as a measure of a player is also statistically flawed because when you homer, you get to count yourself twice even though your team scores only one run. RBI is of course the most flawed statistic of the offensive portfolio this side of batting average, but I use it as a point to illustrate the number of runs-generated by Bonds between him scoring himself and knocking them in.
Barry Bonds' Walks, Total Bases, Runs, RBI through 2004 (2004 numbers projected based on current rate)
Year BB TB BB+TB R RBI R+RBI OPS 1986 65 172 237 72 48 120 746 1987 54 271 325 99 59 158 821 1988 72 264 336 97 58 155 859 1989 93 247 340 96 58 154 777 1990 93 293 386 104 114 218 971 1991 107 262 369 95 116 211 924 1992 127 295 422 109 103 212 1080 1993 126 365 491 129 123 252 1135 1994 74 253 327 89 81 170 1073 1995 120 292 412 109 104 213 1008 1996 151 318 469 122 129 251 1076 1997 145 311 456 123 101 224 1031 1998 130 336 466 120 122 242 1047 1999 73 219 292 91 83 174 1006 2000 117 330 447 129 106 235 1128 2001 177 411 588 129 137 266 1378 2002 198 322 520 117 110 227 1381 2003 148 292 440 111 90 201 1278 2004 245 276 521 129 88 217 1414 Ignoring strike and injury years, Bonds' OPS has been in a huge spike since 2000, leading up to this year's nearly unbelievable number. Not 2001, his 73-HR year. It was outstanding, but a notch lower, and very steady, from 1992 through 1999, when you might say his career level was established.
Now look over at our two specious categories, walks plus total bases and runs plus RBI. Walks plus total bases sees an increase during the last four years, accounted for nearly entirely by walks. The runs plus RBI is pretty flat and constant, and in fact shows the minor downturn you'd expect towards the end of a career for production numbers, albeit extremely good numbers.
As I said, this is all very crude, but basically Bonds is scoring himself and others directly in proportions no greater than before. The OBP revolution, though, indicates that that vastly-increased OBP -- caused by this suicidal intentional walk fad -- is producing far more runs in the overall Giants' lineup. The sum is more than the parts here. I have continued to seek answers as to why the extremely mundane Giants' club has had such success in recent years, particularly this one where no other offensive player is doing that well and where the pitching staff after Jason Schmidt is a disaster area. It's not like Brian Sabean has assembled an A's-style lineup of OBP kings. The team is full of free swingers.
The answer is: opposing managers keep walking Bonds intentionally even though the impact of letting him try for extra base hits hasn't changed one bit.
That 73-HR year was a spike in Barry's power swing. Given his long history of an outstanding batting eye, I don't find it that remarkable in some ways he had one year where he took his personal career season high from 46 to 73. Circumstances of the season and its rhythym are quirky. What's come since, I'm beginning to believe, is not ever-better years from Bonds, but ever-stupider ways of pitching to him, which is to say, not pitching at all. Opposing managers saw one and only one impact player in the Giants' lineup, that 73-homer season, and collectively shrank into their shells.
I'm taking nothing away from Bonds' position as the premiere hitter of our era, perhaps of all-time. Far from it. They should pitch to him; my theory is that what's changed in the last few years is the dimly-understood principles of OBP were over-represented by OPS, which in its way minimizes the impact of OBP, in the minds of GMs and managers unclear on the concept. Their mistaken beliefs were reinforced by long-held baseball myths about 'not letting the best man beat you', the value of the intentional walk, the anecdotal memory of when a rally was killed right after Bonds was walked, etc.
Bonds is not having an exceptional year: he's having a typical excellent year, with some juice off due to age, and is being handed a truly exceptional year by opposing managers and pitchers.
posted by The Crank 2:56 PM
